



Financial innovations often respond to regulation by sidestepping
regulatory restrictions that would otherwise limit activities in which
people wish to engage. Securitization of loans (e.g., credit card receiv-
ables, or subprime residential mortgages) is often portrayed, correctly,
as having arisen in part as a means of “arbitraging” regulatory capital
requirements by booking assets off the balance sheets of regulated
banks. Originators of the loans were able to maintain lower equity cap-
ital against those loans than they otherwise would have needed to
maintain if the loans had been placed on their balance sheets.1
Capital regulation of securitization invited this form of off-bal-
ance-sheet regulatory arbitrage, and did so quite consciously. Several
of the capital requirement rules for the treatment of securitized
assets originated by banks, and for the debts issued by those conduits
and held or guaranteed by banks, were specifically and consciously
designed to permit banks to allocate less capital against their risks
Cato Journal, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2009). Copyright © Cato Institute. All rights
reserved.
Charles W. Calomiris is the Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions
at Columbia University. He thanks Richard Herring, Charles Plosser, and Peter
Wallison for helpful discussions.
1Financial innovations involving regulatory arbitrage can be complex. Securitized
assets implicitly often remain connected to the balance sheet of the bank that origi-
nated them despite the fact that the liabilities issued by the securitization conduits
are not legally protected by the originating bank; lenders not only provide explicit
credit enhancements to their off-balance sheet conduits, they also offer implicit
“guarantees” to the market, which are valued by the market, which expects origina-
tors to voluntarily stand behind the securitized debts of their off-balance sheet con-
duits, at least under most circumstances (this phenomenon is known as implicit
recourse—see Calomiris and Mason 2004).
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if they had been held on their balance sheets (Calomiris 2008a).
Critics of these capital regulations have rightly pointed to these cap-
ital requirements as having contributed to the subprime crisis by per-
mitting banks to maintain insufficient amounts of equity capital per
unit of risk undertaken in their subprime holdings.
Investment banks were also permitted by capital regulations that
were less strict than those applying to commercial banks to engage in
subprime-related risk with insufficient budgeting of equity capital.
Investment banks faced capital regulations under SEC guidelines
that were similar to the more permissive Basel II rules that apply to
commercial banks outside the United States. Because those capital
regulations were less strict than capital regulations imposed on U.S.
banks, investment banks were able to lever their positions more than
commercial banks. Investment banks’ use of overnight repurchase
agreements as their primary source of finance also permitted them
to “ride the yield curve” when using debt to fund their risky asset
positions; in that respect, collateralized repos appeared to offer a
substitute for low-interest commercial bank deposits.2 But as the col-
lateral standing behind those repos declined in value and became
risky, “haircuts” associated with repo collateral became less favorable,
and investment banks were unable to roll over their repos positions,
a liquidity risk that added to their vulnerability and made their equi-
ty capital positions even more insufficient as risk buffers.
There is no doubt that the financial innovations associated with
securitization and repo finance were at least in part motivated by reg-
ulatory arbitrage. Furthermore, there is no doubt that if on-balance-
sheet commercial bank capital regulations had determined the
amount of equity budgeted by all subprime mortgage originators,
then the leverage ratios of the banking system would not have been
as large, and the liquidity risk from repo funding would have been
substantially less, both of which would have contributed to reducing
the magnitude of the financial crisis.
And yet, I do not agree with those who argue that the subprime
crisis is mainly a story of government “errors of omission,” which
allowed banks to avoid regulatory discipline due to the insufficient
application of existing on-balance-sheet commercial bank capital
regulations to the risks undertaken by investment banks and
2Repos grew so fast in recent years that they came to exceed in size the total assets
of the commercial banking system, as discussed in Gorton (2009).
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off-balance-sheet conduits. The main story of the subprime crisis
instead is one of government “errors of commission,” which were far
more important in generating the huge risks and large losses that
brought down the U.S. financial system.
What Went Wrong and Why?
The subprime crisis reflected first and foremost the willingness of
the managers of large financial institutions to take on risks by buying
financial instruments that were improperly priced, which made the
purchases of these instruments contrary to the interests of the share-
holders of the institutions that invested in them. As Calomiris
(2008a) shows, on an ex ante basis, risk was substantially underesti-
mated in the market during the subprime boom of 2003–07.
Reasonable forward-looking estimates of risk were ignored inten-
tionally by senior management of financial institutions, and senior
management structured compensation packages for asset managers
to maximize incentives to undertake these underestimated risks. In
the absence of “regulatory arbitrage,” budgeting a little more regula-
tory capital would have reduced the amount of risk undertaken, and
would have given the system more of a cushion for managing its loss-
es, but the huge losses from underestimated subprime risk still
would have occurred.
The risk-taking mistakes of financial managers were not the result
of random mass insanity; rather, they reflected a policy environment
that strongly encouraged financial managers to underestimate risk in
the subprime mortgage market. Risk-taking was driven by govern-
ment policies; government’s actions were the root problem, not gov-
ernment inaction. How do government policy actions account for the
disastrous decisions of large financial institutions to take on unprof-
itable subprime mortgage risk? In what follows, I review each of the
major areas of government policy distortions (see also Calomiris
2008a and 2008b, Calomiris and Wallison 2008, and Eisenbeis 2008)
and how they encouraged the conscious undertaking of underesti-
mated risk in the market.
Four categories of government error were instrumental in pro-
ducing the crisis: First, lax Fed interest rate policy, especially from
2002 through 2005, promoted easy credit and kept interest rates very
low for a protracted period. The history of postwar monetary policy
has seen only two episodes in which the real Fed funds rate
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remained negative for several consecutive years; those periods are
the high-inflation episode of 1975–78 (which was reversed by the
anti-inflation rate hikes of 1979–82) and the accommodative policy
environment of 2002–05. According to the St. Louis Fed, the
Federal Reserve deviated sharply from its “Taylor Rule” approach to
setting interest rates during the 2002–05 period; Fed funds rates
remained substantially and persistently below the levels that would
have been consistent with the Taylor Rule, even if that rule had been
targeting a 3 percent or 4 percent long-run inflation target.
Not only were short-term real rates held at persistent historic
lows, but because of peculiarities in the bond market related to glob-
al imbalances and Asian demands for medium- and long-term U.S.
Treasuries, the Treasury yield curve was virtually flat during the
2002–05 period. The combination of low short-term rates and a flat
yield curve meant that long-term real interest rates on Treasury
bonds (which are the most relevant benchmarks for setting mortgage
rates and other long-term fixed income assets’ rates) were especially
low relative to their historic norms.
Accommodative monetary policy and a flat yield curve meant that
credit was excessively available to support expansion in the housing
market at abnormally low interest rates, which encouraged overpricing
of houses. There is substantial empirical evidence showing that when
monetary policy is accommodative, banks charge less for bearing risk
(reviewed in Calomiris 2008a), and this seems to be a pattern common
to many countries in the present and the past. According to some
industry observers, low interest rates in 2002–05 also encouraged some
asset managers (who cared more about their fees than about the inter-
ests of their clients) to attract clients by offering to maintain preexist-
ing portfolio yields notwithstanding declines in interest rates; that
financial alchemy was possible only because asset managers decided to
purchase very risky assets and pretend that they were not very risky.
Second, numerous government policies specifically promoted
subprime risk-taking by financial institutions. Those policies includ-
ed (a) political pressures from Congress on the government-spon-
sored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to promote
“affordable housing” by investing in high-risk subprime mortgages,
(b) lending subsidies policies via the Federal Home Loan Bank
System to its member institutions that promoted high mortgage
leverage and risk, (c) FHA subsidization of high mortgage leverage
Cato Journal
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and risk, (d) government and GSE mortgage foreclosure mitigation
protocols that were developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s to
reduce the costs to borrowers of failing to meet debt service require-
ments on mortgages, and—almost unbelievably—(e) 2006 legislation
that encouraged ratings agencies to relax their standards for measur-
ing risk in subprime securitizations.
All of these government policies contributed to encouraging the
underestimation of subprime risk, but the politicization of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac and the actions of members of Congress to
encourage reckless lending by the GSEs in the name of affordable
housing were arguably the most damaging policy actions leading up
to the crisis. In order for Fannie and Freddie to maintain their
implicit (now explicit) government guarantees on their debts, which
contributed substantially to their profitability, they had to cater to the
political whims of their masters in the government. In the context of
recent times, that meant making risky subprime loans (Calomiris and
Wallison 2008, Calomiris 2008b). Fannie and Freddie ended up
holding $1.5 trillion in exposures to toxic mortgages, which consti-
tutes half of the total non-FHA outstanding amount of toxic mort-
gages (Pinto 2008).
A review of e-mail correspondence between risk managers and
senior management at the GSEs (Calomiris 2008b) reveals that those
positions were taken despite objections by risk managers, who
viewed them as imprudent, and who predicted that the GSEs would
lead the rest of the market into huge overpricing of risky mortgages.
Indeed, it is likely that absent the involvement of Fannie and
Freddie in aggressive subprime buying beginning in 2004, the total
magnitude of toxic mortgages originated would have been less than
half its actual amount, since Fannie and Freddie crowded in market
participation more than they crowded it out.
What aspects of GSE involvement in the market suggest that on
net they crowded in, rather than crowded out, private investment in
subprime and Alt-A mortgages? First, the timing of GSE involve-
ment was important. Their aggressive ramping up of purchases of
these products in 2004 coincided with the acceleration of subprime
growth. Total subprime and Alt-A originations grew from $395 bil-
lion in 2003 to $715 billion in 2004 and increased to $1,005 billion in
2005 (Calomiris 2008a, Table 2). Furthermore, the GSEs stayed in
these markets long after the mid-2006 flattening of house prices,
Financial Innovation
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which signaled to many other lenders the need to exit the subprime
market; during the last year of the subprime and Alt-A origination
boom, when originations remained near peak levels despite clear evi-
dence of impending problems, the GSEs were crucial in maintaining
financing for subprime and Alt-A securities.
The GSEs also were uniquely large and protected players in the
mortgage market (due to their GSE status), and thus could set stan-
dards and influence pricing in ways that other lenders could not.
These unique qualities were noted by Freddie Mac’s risk managers
when they referred to Freddie’s role in “mak[ing] a market” in no-
docs mortgages. After 2004, and continuing long after the subprime
market turned down in 2006, originators of subprime and Alt-A
mortgages knew that the GSEs stood ready to buy their poorly
underwritten instruments, and this GSE legitimization of unsound
underwriting practices gave assurance to market participants that
there was a ready source of demand for the new product. That had
important consequences both for initially accelerating and later
maintaining the large quantity of subprime and Alt-A mortgage deal
flow and for promoting the overpricing and overleveraging of these
instruments. That “market mak[ing]” role of the GSEs had conse-
quences for the expansion of the market and the pricing of subprime
and Alt-A mortgages and mortgage-backed securities that exceeded
the particular securities purchased or guarantees made by the GSEs.
Third, government regulations limiting who can buy stock in banks
made effective corporate governance within large financial institutions
virtually impossible, which allowed bank management to pursue
investments that were unprofitable for stockholders in the long run,
but that were very profitable to management in the short run, given
the short time horizons of managerial compensation systems.
Pensions, mutual funds, insurance companies, and banks are
restricted from holding anything but tiny stakes in any particular
company, which makes these informed professional investors virtual-
ly impotent in promoting any change within badly managed firms.
Hostile takeovers, which often provide an alternative means of disci-
pline for mismanaged nonfinancial firms, are not a feasible source of
discipline for financial companies; banks are service providers whose
franchise consists largely of human capital, and the best parts of that
human capital can flee to competitors as soon as nasty takeover bat-
tles begin (a poison pill even better than standard takeover defens-
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es). What about the possibility that a hedge fund or private equity
investor might intervene to become a major blockholder in a finan-
cial firm and try to change it from within? That possibility is obviat-
ed by the bank holding company act, which prevents any entity with
a controlling interest in a nonfinancial company from acquiring a
controlling interest in a bank holding company (the definition of the
size of a controlling interest was relaxed in the wake of the 2008 cri-
sis to encourage more blockholding, but that change was too little
and too late).
When stockholder discipline is absent managers are able to set up
the management of risk within the firms they manage to benefit them-
selves at the expense of stockholders. An asset bubble (like the sub-
prime bubble of 2003–07) offers an ideal opportunity; if senior
managers establish compensation systems that reward subordinates
based on total assets managed or total revenues collected, without
regard to risk or future potential loss, then subordinates are incen-
tivized to expand portfolios rapidly during the bubble without regard
to risk. Senior managers then reward themselves for having overseen
that “successful” expansion with large short-term bonuses, and make
sure to cash out their stock options quickly so that a large portion of
their money is safely invested elsewhere by the time the bubble bursts.
Fourth, prudential regulation of commercial banks by the govern-
ment has proven to be ineffective. That failure reflects (a) problems
in measuring bank risk resulting from regulation’s ill-considered
reliance on credit rating agencies assessments and internal bank
models to measure risk, and (b) the too-big-to-fail problem (Stern
and Feldman 2004), which makes it difficult to credibly enforce
effective discipline on large, complex banks even if regulators detect
that they have suffered large losses and that they have accumulated
imprudently large risks.
With respect to the former, I reiterate that the risk measurement
problem is not merely that regulators and their rules regarding secu-
ritization permitted the booking of subprime risks off of commercial
bank balance sheets; the measurement of subprime risk, and the cap-
ital budgeted against that risk, would still have been much too low if
all the subprime risk had been booked entirely on commercial bank
balance sheets. Regulators utilize different means to assess risk,
depending on the size of the bank. Under the simplest version of reg-
ulatory measurement of bank risk, subprime mortgages have a low
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asset risk weight (50 percent that of commercial loans) even though
they are much riskier than most bank loans. The more complex
measurement of subprime risk (applicable to larger U.S. banks)
relies on the opinions of ratings agencies or the internal assessments
of banks, and unsurprisingly, neither of those assessments is inde-
pendent of bank management.
Rating agencies, after all, are supposed to cater to buy-side market
participants, but when their ratings are used for regulatory purposes,
buy-side participants reward rating agencies for underestimating risk,
since that helps the buy-side clients avoid regulation. Many observers
wrongly believe that the problem with rating agency grade inflation of
securitized debts is that sellers of these debts (sponsors of securitiza-
tions) pay for ratings; on the contrary, the problem is that the buyers of
the debts want inflated ratings because of the regulatory benefits they
receive from those inflated ratings.
The too-big-to-fail problem relates to the lack of credibility of reg-
ulatory discipline for large, complex banks. For small banks, the fail-
ure to manage risk properly results in “intervention” by regulators,
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA) framework established in 1991, which forces sale or liqui-
dation of sufficiently undercapitalized banks. But for large, complex
banks, the prospect of intervening is so potentially disruptive to the
financial system that regulators have an incentive to avoid interven-
tion. The incentives that favor “forebearance” can make it hard for
regulators to ensure compliance.
The too-big-to-fail problem magnifies the so-called moral-hazard
problem of the government safety net; banks that expect to be pro-
tected by deposit insurance, Fed lending, and Treasury-Fed
bailouts, and that believe that they are beyond discipline, will tend
to take on excessive risk, since the taxpayers share the costs of that
excessive risk on the downside. And just as importantly, banks that
are protected by the government from the discipline of the market-
place will be too tolerant of bad management, since managerial
errors normally punished by failure will be hidden under the
umbrella of government protection.
The moral hazard of the too-big-to-fail problem was clearly visible
in the behavior of the large investment banks in 2008. After Bear
Stearns was rescued by a Treasury-Fed bailout in March, Lehman,
Merrill Lynch, Morgan-Stanley and Goldman Sachs sat on their
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hands for six months awaiting further developments (i.e., either an
improvement in the market environment or a handout from Uncle
Sam). In particular, Lehman did little to raise capital or shore up its
position. But when conditions deteriorated and the anticipated
bailout failed to materialize for Lehman in September 2008—show-
ing that there were limits to Treasury-Fed generosity—the other
major investment banks immediately either became acquired or
transformed themselves into commercial bank holding companies to
increase their access to government support.
The too-big-to-fail moral-hazard problem is not a natural conse-
quence of the existence of large, complex institutions. Like the other
policy failures enumerated here, it reflects government decisions. In
the case of too-big-to-fail, the government has made two key errors:
First, protection has been offered too frequently (e.g., the bailout of
Continental Bank in 1984 was not justified by plausible “systemic risk”
concerns); some of the moral-hazard cost associated with too-big-to-fail
could be eliminated just by being more selective in applying the doc-
trine. Second, if the government didmore to create a credible interven-
tion and resolution process for large, complex banks that become
troubled, then much of the cost of too-big-to-fail could be eliminated.
If, for example, the government required that a feasible and credible
intervention plan be maintained on an ongoing basis for every large,
complex institution, then it would not need to forebear from interven-
ing in such institutions when they become deeply undercapitalized.
To be feasible and credible an intervention plan would have to
ensure the seamless continuing operation and funding of the institu-
tion’s lending and other important market transactions, and would
have to define in advance loss-sharing arrangements among the sub-
sidiaries within the organization that deal with one another (and
those loss-sharing arrangements would have to be approved in
advance by the various countries’ regulators in which the subsidiaries
are located). One of the most intractable problems of complex glob-
ally diverse banks is defining loss-sharing arrangements across bor-
ders in the midst of a financial crisis. Bankruptcy procedures appear
to be too cumbersome for dealing with the smooth transfer of con-
trol and funding, and the lack of a prearranged agreement among
regulators about loss sharing means that bankruptcy (as in the case of
Lehman) can entail complex and protracted adjudication of inter-
subsidiary claims in many different legal venues.
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The “bridge bank” structure exists in the United States and a few
other countries as a means of transitioning to new control and fund-
ing sources, but this structure has not been used during the sub-
prime crisis, perhaps because it is too difficult to define its structure
and determine loss-sharing arrangements across subsidiaries after
the fact. The primary policy failure relating to too-big-to-fail prob-
lems is not the decision to forebear from intervening in the midst of
the crisis, but rather the decision not to have prepared properly for
the eventuality of having to intervene.
In summary, the greatest threats that financial sector policy must
confront have to do with the ways that the rules of the game shaped
by government policy promote willfully excessive, value-destroying
risks. The pursuit of value-destroying risks arises most easily during
moments of accommodative monetary policy, and the low interest
rate environment of 2002–05 was among the most accommodative in
U.S. history. Value-destroying risk-taking during the recent subprime
mortgage boom and bust was motivated by (1) political pressures to
lend unwisely (e.g., the pressures that led Fannie and Freddie to
pursue the expansion of “affordable housing” despite its costs to tax-
payers and unwitting home buyers), (2) bank agency problems (i.e.,
policies that allow bankers to avoid stockholder discipline in pursuit
of their own self interest), and (3) safety-net protections (including
too-big-to-fail policies) that make value-destroying risks personally
beneficial to financiers and their stockholders.
Regulatory Reform for a World Populated by Humans
One response to the litany of woe outlined above is to suggest
that the raft of government distortions that produce financial sector
disasters be eliminated. If there were no governmental safety nets,
no government manipulation of credit markets, no leverage subsi-
dies, and no limitations on the market for corporate control, one
could reasonably argue against the need for prudential regulation.
Indeed, the history of financial crises shows that in times and places
where these government interventions were absent, financial crises
were relatively rare and not very severe (Calomiris 2007).
That laissez-faire argument, however, neglects two counterargu-
ments: First, there may be substantial negative externalities associat-
ed with bank risk management. Part of the benefit from one bank’s
reducing its risk is shared by other banks (since the failure of one
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large institution can have repercussions for others), and that implies
that if banks are left to their own devices they will choose levels of
risk that are higher than the socially optimal levels.
Second, it is not very helpful to suggest only regulatory changes that
are very far beyond the feasible bounds of the current political environ-
ment. It is useful to point to the desirability of many simultaneous fun-
damental reforms of government policy, but it is also useful to outline a
policy reform strategy for a world that is not amenable to the reasoned
arguments of libertarian economists. Absent the elimination of govern-
ment safety nets, government credit subsidies, and government limits
on corporate control, government prudential regulation is a must, even
for those who are not convinced by the prior argument about risk-man-
agement externalities. Until and unless these three categories of exist-
ing government distortion are eliminated, we must mitigate their
harmful effects by establishing effective prudential regulations.
If one is going to design a regulatory system that works in the pres-
ence of these various distortions, it will have to be designed on the
basis of principles that transcend the mathematics of finance. As
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) rightly note, bankers are not
angels, and neither are bank regulators or congressmen or cabinet
secretaries. Bank managers often are willing to take advantage of
stockholders or game the government safety net. Regulators are cor-
ruptible, particularly when they are threatened by superiors who
encourage them to follow the path of least political resistance.
Politicians will pressure banks to make unprofitable loans and will be
too generous in their construction of bank safety nets because of con-
stituencies that reward them for doing so.
Successful bank regulation takes into account all these human fail-
ings and devises mechanisms that are able to succeed reasonably well
in spite of them. The trick in regulatory reform is to use the public
outrage during a moment of crisis as an opportunity to pass robust
reforms that will work after the crisis is gone and the threats of polit-
ical influence, safety nets, and managerial agency have returned.
That is not easy, but experience and empirical evidence suggests that
some solutions to these problems are more successful than others.
In the remainder of this article, I review several ideas for regulato-
ry reform that are desirable not only because they make sense techni-
cally as ways tomeasure andmanage risk, but also because of the effect
they have on the incentives of bankers and bank regulators; in other
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words, because they are relatively robust to the government policy
problems, and human failings, that were at the heart of the subprime
crisis. This is not an exhaustive review of financial regulation, or even
banking regulation. My focus is on the structure and content of bank
prudential regulation, with an emphasis on how to structure regulato-
ry mechanisms that would improve the effectiveness of the measure-
ment and management of risk in the banking system.
I review six categories of policy reform that would address weak-
nesses of the policy environment that gave rise to the subprime cri-
sis, including those reviewed earlier. These six areas are: (1) smarter
“micro prudential” regulation of banks, (2) new ideas for “macro pru-
dential” regulation of bank capital and liquidity standards, (3) the
creation of detailed and regularly updated prepackaged “bridge
bank” plans for large, complex financial organizations, (4) reforms to
eliminate the distortions in housing finance induced by government
policies that encourage high risk and leveraging, (5) reforms that
would improve stockholder discipline of banks, and (6) initiatives to
encourage greater transparency in derivatives transactions.
Making Micro Prudential Capital Regulation Smarter
Prudential capital regulation refers to regulations that try to
measure bank risk and budget capital (equity plus other capital
accounts) accordingly to protect against potential loss related to that
risk. “Micro” prudential capital regulation refers to the setting of cap-
ital based on the analysis of the circumstances of the individual insti-
tution. Below I also consider “macro” prudential regulation, which
refers to variation over time in the minimal amounts of capital, liq-
uidity, and provisioning for loss required of banks that occurs as a
function of the macroeconomic state of the economy.
The two key challenges in micro prudential capital regulation are
(1) finding ways to measure the value and the riskiness of different
assets accurately, and (2) ensuring speedy intervention to prevent
losses from growing once banks become severely undercapitalized. I
emphasize that these are not just technical issues. Banks, supervisors,
regulators, and politicians often have incentives to understate losses
and risks and to avoid timely intervention. Timely intervention is cru-
cial, however. If subprime risk had been correctly identified in 2005,
the run-up in subprime lending in 2006 and 2007 could have been
avoided; banks would have had to budget much more capital against
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those positions, which would have discouraged continuing growth in
subprime lending. Furthermore, banks that have experienced large
losses often have incentives to further increase their risk, since they
have little of their own capital left to lose; that go-for-broke “resur-
rection” risk-taking can be prevented by regulators only if they time-
ly identify and intervene in severely undercapitalized banks.
How can regulation ensure accurate and timely information about
the value and riskiness of assets? The key problem with the current
system of measuring asset values and risks is that it depends on bank
reporting, supervisors’ observations, and rating agencies’ opinions.
None of those three parties has a strong interest in correct and time-
ly measurement of asset value and risk. Furthermore, even if super-
visors were extremely diligent in their effort to measure value and
risk accurately, how could they successfully defend low valuations or
high risk estimates that were entirely the result of the application of
their models and judgment?
The essence of the solution to this problem is to bring objective
information from the market into the regulatory process, and to
bring outside (market) sources of discipline in debt markets to bear
in penalizing bank risk-taking. These approaches have been tried fre-
quently outside the United States, and they have often worked. With
respect to bringing market information to bear in measuring risk, one
approach to measuring the risk of a loan is to use the interest rate
paid on a loan as an index of its risk. Higher risk loans tend to pay
higher interest. Argentine bank capital standards introduced this
approach successfully in the 1990s by setting capital requirements on
loans using loan interest rates (Calomiris and Powell 2001). If that
had been done with high-interest subprime loans, the capital
requirements on those loans would have been much higher.
Another complementary measure would be to require banks to
issue some form of credibly uninsured debt. Forcing banks to access
uninsured debt markets forces them to meet an external source of
discipline from the market, which means that they have a strong
incentive to credibly satisfy market concerns about the value and
riskiness of their assets. Furthermore, the interest rates paid on at-
risk debts provide valuable information about market perceptions of
bank risk (a proverbial canary in the coal mine), which would be
immune to manipulation by bankers, supervisors, regulators, or
politicians.
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Segoviano (2008) shows that bank credit default swap (CDS)
spreads contained very informative market opinions about differ-
ences in risk across banks in 2008, and about the mutual dependence
among large banks with respect to risk. That experience is not unusu-
al; there is a large body of evidence in support of the efficacy of using
market information and discipline to measure and control bank risk.
The evidence of the effectiveness of this approach spans many coun-
tries, and comes from historical as well as current examples.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 required the Fed and
Treasury to consider that approach in the form of a subordinated
debt requirement. A Fed report (Board of Governors 1999) showed
that substantial research favored this approach, but lobbying from
the big banks to avoid discipline encouraged Treasury Secretary
Lawrence Summers and Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan to kill this
promising idea. Now is the time to bring this idea back by requiring
banks to offer credibly uninsured debt instruments as part of their
capital structure. There are a variety of possible instruments that
could be required to provide market information about risk and mar-
ket discipline on banks. The Shadow Financial Regulatory Commit-
tee (2000) offered a blueprint of how to structure the rules
surrounding a minimum subordinated debt requirement. That pro-
posal was written prior to the development of the CDS market,
which likely could provide a useful alternative to subordinated debt
in the form of the market pricing of credit risk insurance. Flannery
(2009) discusses the potential advantages of “contingent capital cer-
tificates” (CCC)—debts that convert to equity when banks suffer
sufficient portfolio losses—rather than straight subordinated debt for
this purpose; Flannery argues that CCC might work better than sub-
ordinated debt as a source of information about risk and a form of
market discipline, given the greater potential for rapid loss on CCC
in states of the world where losses become large.
Finally, with respect to the use of credit rating agencies’ opinions
to measure the riskiness of assets held in bank portfolios, given the
low likelihood that regulators will be willing to eliminate entirely the
use of ratings in favor of reliance on market opinions, there is a sec-
ond-best alternative reform. Ratings used for regulatory purposes
should be provided in numerical form, not as letter grades. Letter
grades as forward-looking opinions have no objective meaning that
can be evaluated and penalized for inaccuracy after the fact. But
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numerical estimates of the probability of default (PD) and loss given
default (LGD) do have objective, measurable meanings. Rating
agencies that provide ratings used by regulators (so-called Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations or NRSROs) should
have to provide specific estimates of the PD and LGD for any rated
instrument, not just a letter grade.
Rating agencies already calculate and report such statistics retro-
spectively on instruments that they rate, and presumably their letter
grades are meant to translate into forward-looking predictions of
these numbers. But requiring NRSROs to express ratings using
numbers would alter their incentives to rate risk dramatically. If
NRSROs were penalized for underestimating risk (say, with a six-
month “sit out” from having their ratings used for regulatory purpos-
es), they would have a strong self-interest in correctly estimating risk,
since the reduced demand for their services during the sit out would
affect their fee income. It would be easy to devise an algorithm for
such a sit out: if an NRSRO’s estimates of either the PD or the LGD
are sufficiently low relative to actual experience for a sufficiently long
time, they would be punished with a six-month sit out.
Another proposal for making micro prudential regulation smarter
would be to raise regulatory requirements for organizations that are
large and highly complex. This policy could take the form of a high-
er capital requirement, a higher provisioning requirement, or a high-
er liquidity requirement. The argument in favor of such a policy is
that, in the presence of the too-big-to-fail problem, large, complex
banks are (1) less likely to manage risk properly, and (2) more likely
to create problems for the financial system if they become undercap-
italized. Thus, forcing them to maintain higher capital and/or greater
liquidity would offset some of the social costs associated with their
decisions to become too big to fail.
These proposed reforms to micro prudential regulation could be
extremely helpful, but by themselves they are insufficient. Recent
experience has shown that even honest market opinions and bona
fide credit ratings vary in quality over time, and regulatory sur-
charges for large banks probably would not have been adequate for
deterring the credit boom of 2002–07. During the subprime boom,
especially given the agency problems in asset management that
accompanied the policy-induced bubble, risk was underestimated in
the market across the board. Micro prudential rules that rely on signals
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from the market will not work adequately during episodes when dis-
tortionary policies promote the systemic underestimation of risk in
debt markets. Recognizing that limitation to micro prudential regu-
lation is the primary motivation for adopting additional reforms,
including a relatively new idea in financial regulation known as
“macro” prudential policy.
Macro Prudential Regulation Triggers
Macro prudential regulation means making the key parameters of
prudential regulation (capital requirements, liquidity requirements,
and provisioning policies) vary according to macroeconomic circum-
stances. That variation takes two forms: (1) normal cyclical variation
in minimum capital requirements as part of countercyclical econom-
ic policy, and (2) special triggering of increased prudential require-
ments during states of the world in which “asset bubbles” are
probably occurring.
The first of these ideas reflects the longstanding recognition that
minimum capital requirements that are constant throughout the
business cycle are procyclical in their effects: recessions produce
bank loan losses, which reduce capital, which forces banks to shrink
their lending, which deepens recessions. Repullo and Suarez (2008)
simulate bank capital and asset decisions in a model of dynamically
optimizing banks under the Basel standards and show that the stan-
dards induce substantial procyclicality of credit supply. Adding a sim-
ple leverage limit (like the one that already exists as an additional
capital requirement in the United States) reduces the procyclicality
of credit somewhat, but the best approach is to vary prudential reg-
ulation over the business cycle so that capital, reserve, and provision-
ing standards are loosened a bit at the onset of recessionary shocks.
To maintain the adequacy of those requirements during recessions,
therefore, one would have to raise minimum capital requirements
during boom times, probably substantially above the current mini-
mum capital requirements that apply under either the Basel stan-
dards or the U.S. leverage standard.
The second macro prudential idea—increasing capital require-
ments by more than normal during boom times when the boom also
coincides with a high degree of financial vulnerability, as during an
asset bubble—has been a topic of debate for the past decade, and
reflects the commonly held view that both the pre-2001 Internet
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bubble and the pre-2007 subprime bubble (and the related phenom-
ena that occurred in parallel outside the United States) could have
been avoided if policymakers had leaned against the wind to prevent
the bubbles from inflating.
Before embracing that idea, however, advocates of macro pruden-
tial regulation must be able to answer three questions: (1) Why
should prudential regulation, rather than monetary policy, be the tool
used to lean against the wind during bubbles? (2) Is it feasible to reli-
ably identify bubbles in real time and vary prudential requirements
to respond to the bubble? (3) What are the potential costs of imple-
menting such an approach?
In answer to the first question, the Fed and other central banks
already have their hands full using one tool (the short-term interest
rate controlled by the central bank) to hit two targets (low inflation
and full employment). Adding a third target to monetary policy
(namely, identifying and deflating asset bubbles) would be undesir-
able because it would complicate and undermine the ability to use
interest rates to meet the key goals of monetary policy, and this dis-
traction would also make it harder to hold central banks to account
for achieving low inflation and high employment: if we try to incor-
porate secondary objectives into interest rate policy, we may give
central banks an excuse for failing to meet their primary objectives.
Furthermore, prudential regulation is ideally suited to addressing
asset market bubbles, since loose credit supply has been so closely
identified historically with the growth of asset bubbles. Prudential
regulations would clearly succeed in reducing the supply of credit by
tightening capital, liquidity, and provisioning requirements, and this
is the most direct and promising approach to attacking the problem
of a building asset price bubble, assuming that one can be identified.
How good are we at identifying bubbles in real time? Is it realis-
tic to think that policymakers can identify a bubble quickly enough,
and adjust prudential regulations in a timely manner to mitigate bub-
bles and increase the resilience of the banking system in dealing with
the consequences of the bubble’s bursting? Recent research and
experience is encouraging in this respect. Borio and Drehmann
(2008) develop a practical approach to identifying ex ante signals of
bubbles that could be used by policymakers to vary prudential regu-
lations in a timely way in reaction to the beginning of a bubble. They
find that moments of high credit growth that coincide with either
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unusually rapid stock market appreciation or unusually rapid house
price appreciation are followed by unusually severe recessions. They
show that a signaling model that identifies bubbles in this way (i.e.,
as moments in which both credit growth is rapid and one or both key
asset price indicators is rising rapidly) would have allowed policy-
makers to prevent some of the worst boom and bust cycles in the
recent experience of developed countries. They find that the signal-
to-noise ratio of their model is high; adjustment of prudential rules
in response to a signal indicating the presence of a bubble would
miss few bubbles and would only rarely signal a bubble in the
absence of one.
Recent experience by policymakers has also been encouraging.
Spain (the thought leader in the advocacy of macro prudential regu-
lation) displayed success in leaning against the wind recently by
establishing provisioning rules that are linked to aggregate credit
growth. Colombia also was successful in applying a similar approach
in 2007 and 2008 (Uribe 2008).
Financial system loans in Colombia grew from a 10 percent annu-
al rate as of December 2005 to a 27 percent rate as of December
2006. Core CPI growth also rose from 3.5 percent in April 2006 to
4.8 percent in April 2007, real GDP was growing at 8 percent for
2007, and the current account deficit doubled as a percentage of
GDP from the second half of 2006 to the first half of 2007, rising
from 1.8 percent of GDP to 3.6 percent. Interestingly, that credit
boom occurred in spite of attempts by the central bank to use inter-
est rate policy to lean against the wind; interest rates were raised
beginning in April 2006, and by mid-2008 had been raised a total of
four percentage points. In 2008, the central bank and the bank
superintendency took a different tack, raising reserve requirements
and provisioning requirements on loans, and imposing other rules to
limit borrowing from abroad. The banking system’s risk-weighted
capital ratio rose to 13.9 percent, and credit growth fell to 13 percent
in 2008. Colombian authorities are now basking in praise for having
reduced credit growth and strengthened their banks’ capital posi-
tions in a manner that will substantially mitigate the backlash suf-
fered by Colombian banks from the global financial collapse.
Macro prudential regulation could use a variety of warning signs as
triggers for increases in regulatory standards. Rather than simply
focusing on credit growth, Borio and Drehmann’s (2008) findings sug-
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gest that a combination of credit growth and asset price appreciation
may be optimal. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) argue for the desirability
of including measures of systemic leverage and maturity structure.
What would be the economic costs associated with adopting
macro prudential triggers to combat asset bubbles? Presumably, the
main costs would result from false positives (i.e., the social costs asso-
ciated with credit slowdowns and capital raising by banks during
periods identified as bubbles that are in fact not bubbles). These
costs, however, are likely to be small. If a bank believes that extraor-
dinary growth is based in fundamentals rather than a bubble, then
that bank can raise capital in support of continuing loan expansion (in
fact, banks have done so during booms in the past). The cost to banks
of raising a bit more capital during expansions is relatively small;
those costs consist primarily of adverse-selection costs (reflected in
fees to investment banks and underpricing of shares), which tend to
be small during asset price booms. Indeed, some researchers argue
that “hot” markets tend to produce overpriced equity, meaning that
banks might enjoy negative costs (positive benefits) of raising capital
during such periods.
Most importantly, macro prudential triggers would promote pro-
cyclical equity ratios for banks, which would mitigate the agency and
moral-hazard problems that encourage banks to increase leverage
during booms. Adrian and Shin (2008) show that during the sub-
prime boom, commercial banks and (even more so) investment
banks substantially raised their leverage (which was permitted by the
underestimation of their asset risk by regulatory capital standards).
Prior to the establishment of government safety nets and other
policies already noted, however, banks behaved differently.
Calomiris and Wilson (2004) show that during the boom era of the
1920s, New York City banks expanded their lending dramatically,
and their loan-to-asset ratios also rose as the banks participated
actively in promoting the growth in economic activity and stock
prices during the 1920s. But the banks also recognized the rising risk
of their assets, and made adjustments accordingly. Rising asset risk
led the banks to substantially raise their equity capital. New York
banks went to the equity market frequently in the 1920s, and on
average increased their market ratios of equity to assets from 14 per-
cent in 1920 to 28 percent in 1928. Virtually no New York City banks
failed during the Depression. In a sense, the primary goal of macro
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prudential regulation can be viewed as restoring the natural procycli-
cal tendency of bank equity ratios. That tendency has been discour-
aged by government policies that removed market constraints and
incentives and thus discouraged banks from budgeting increased
capital during booms.
Prepackaged “Bridge Bank” Plans for Large, Complex Banks
The too-big-to-fail problemcanbe addressed adequately only if reg-
ulators and bankers alike believe that regulators will be willing and able
to intervene and resolve undercapitalized large, complex banks in a
timely fashion. The United States established prompt corrective action
guidelines in the 1991 FDICIA legislation, which was meant to con-
strain regulatory discretion about intervention and resolution, avoid
regulatory forbearance, and ensure rapid action by regulators. And the
United States has established a bridge bank structure that can be
applied to speed the resolution of banks that are taken over by regula-
tory authorities (Herring 2009). Despite these actions, however, none
of the large banks in the United States that became undercapitalized
during the recent crisis has been resolved through such a structure.
The only way that prompt corrective action can be credibly applied
to large, complex banks is if the social costs of intervening in those
banks is considered sufficiently low at the time intervention is called
for; otherwise, political and economic considerations will prevent
intervention. To that end, commercial banks should be required to
maintain updated and detailed plans for their own resolution, with spe-
cific pre-defined loss-sharing formulas that can be applied across sub-
sidiaries within the institution operating across national borders. Those
loss-sharing formulas must be pre-approved by the regulators in the
countries where those subsidiaries operate. The existence of such a
prepackaged plan would make intervention and resolution credible.
Requiring detailed and credible prepackaged and pre-approved
resolution plans would have ex ante and ex post benefits for the finan-
cial system. Ex ante, it would make large, complex banks more careful
in managing their affairs, and internalize the costs of complexity with-
in those organizations. In other words, because complexity and its risks
are hard to manage, that makes planning the resolution of large, com-
plex institutions harder and more costly. If the institutions are forced
to plan their resolutions credibly in advance, and if it is very costly for
them to do so, then they may appropriately decide to be less complex
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and smaller. Ex post, changes in the control over distressed banks
would occur with minimal disruption to other financial firms, and
because financial problems could be resolved more quickly, manageri-
al incompetence would be more speedily corrected, and “resurrection
risk-taking” would be avoided.
Reforming Housing Finance
The United States has made access to affordable housing a center-
piece of government policy for generations. The philosophy behind
this idea is that homeowners have a stake in their communities and in
their society, and thus make better citizens. That argument may have
merit, and the costs of promoting access to housing (especially the cost
from crowding out of non-housing investments) may be warranted.
But highly leveraged homeowners (e.g., those borrowing 97 percent of
the value of their homes using an FHA guarantee) have little stake in
their homes; indeed, it might be more accurate to refer to them as
homeowners in name but renters in reality.
The key error in U.S. housing policy has been the use by the gov-
ernment of leverage subsidies as the means to encourage homeown-
ership. Prospective homeowners are helped by the government only
if they (or their lending institution) are looking for cheap credit, and
the size of the subsidy they receive is proportional to their willingness
to borrow. FHA guarantees, Federal Home Loan advances, and gov-
ernment guarantees of GSE debts all operate via leverage.
These subsidies are delivered in an inefficient and distorting man-
ner. Subsidizing the GSEs has been inefficient, since much of the
government subsidy has accrued to GSE stockholders; only a portion
has been passed on to homeowners in the form of reduced interest
rates on mortgages. And leverage subsidies distort bank and borrow-
er decisions by encouraging them to expose themselves and the
financial system to too much risk related to interest rate movements
and housing price changes. It is remarkable to think that the U.S.
financial system was brought to its knees by small declines in average
U.S. housing prices, which would have had little effect if housing
leverage had been maintained at reasonable levels.3
3The most popular measure of house prices, the Case-Shiller index, substantially
overstates house price decline due to regional bias and selectivity bias in the meas-
urement of price change, as discussed in Calomiris (2008a). Average house prices in
the United States, properly measured, probably declined from their peak by less
than 20 percent as of February 2009.
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The GSEs, which are now in conservatorship, should be wound
down as soon as possible, and the FHA and Federal Home Loan
Banks should be phased out. In their place, the United States could
establish an affordable housing program that assists first-time home-
owners with their down payments (e.g., offering people with low
income a lump sum subsidy to apply toward their down payments).
Improving Bank Stockholder Discipline
Sweeping changes should be made to the regulation of bank stock-
holders. As described above, current regulations almost guarantee that
large banks will be owned by a fragmented group of shareholders who
cannot rein in managers, thus encouraging managers to use the banks
to feather their own nests. That agency problem not only produces sig-
nificant waste within banks on an ongoing basis, it makes the allocation
of capital in the economy inefficient; banks are supposed to act as the
brain of the economy, but will not do so if their incentives are distort-
ed by managers in pursuit of ends other than the maximization of value
for their shareholders. And, in the presence of circumstances con-
ducive to bubbles, as we have seen recently, incentive problems can
translate into systemic crises with deep costs, including interruptions
in the normal flow of credit, widespread job losses, and destruction of
wealth throughout the economy.
A first-best solution would be outright repeal, or at least a significant
relaxation, of the bank holding company act restrictions on ownership of
banks, alongwith the relaxation of other restrictions thatmake it hard for
stockholders to discipline managers (ceilings on institutional investors’
holdings, and Williams Act disclosures). These reforms seem unlikely to
be enacted at the present time. In the presence of continuing distortions
relating to corporate governance, bank stockholders—who should be
the first line of defense in the financial system against unwise risk-taking
by bank management—are unable to exert much of a role. That implies
even more of a burden on regulators to implement reforms in micro
prudential regulation, macro prudential regulation, and resolution poli-
cies that will limit the social costs associated with banking crises.
Transparency in Derivatives Transactions
The growth of over-the-counter transactions in recent years has
raised new challenges for prudential regulation. OTC transactions
are not always cleared through a clearinghouse. Counterparty risk in
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transactions that do not involve a clearinghouse is borne bilaterally by
contracting parties, and the true counterparty risk can be hard to
measure, since the aggregate amount of transactions and the net
amounts of transaction exposures of any one counterparty are not
known to the other counterparties. This problem is magnified by the
“daisy chain” effect: If A is a counterparty of B, and C is a counter-
party of B, then the counterparty risk A bears in its dealings with B
is partly the result of the counterparty risk B bears in its dealings with
C, which is unobservable to A.
The lack of transparency about counterparty risk not only creates
risk management problems for banks, it also complicates the regulato-
ry process. Regulators are not able to monitor or control individual
institution risk (via micro prudential rules) or aggregate risk (via macro
prudential rules) if they cannot observe risk accurately. Furthermore,
since the counterparty risks in OTC transactions are especially great
for large, complex banks, the opacity of those risks aggravates the too-
big-to-fail problem. Large, complex banks may even have incentives to
undertake more hard-to-observe risk precisely because its complexity
and opacity helps to insulate them from intervention.
How should prudential regulatory policy respond to this problem?
There are two separate issues that must be addressed by regulators:
encouraging clearing and encouraging disclosure. Policy reforms
related to clearing mainly address the problem of counterparty risk
opacity. Policy reforms related to disclosure mainly address the prob-
lem of monitoring and controlling the net risk positions of individual
banks and the systemic consequences of those positions.
With respect to clearing, one option for dealing with systemic con-
sequences of opacity in counterparty risk would be to require that all
derivatives contracts be cleared through a clearinghouse. Note that
this is not the same as requiring that all transactions be traded on an
exchange. Some OTC derivatives are cleared in clearinghouses even
though they are not traded on the exchanges affiliated with those clear-
inghouses. When clearing through the clearinghouse, counterparty
risk is no longer bilateral, but rather is transferred to the clearinghouse,
which effectively stands in the middle of all transactions as a counter-
party and thereby eliminates the problem of measuring counterparty
risk, or having to worry about “daisy chain” effects relating to counter-
party risk. Of course, relying on clearinghouses to centralize counter-
party risk requires faith in the efficacy of the self-regulatory rules that
ensure the stability of the clearinghouse (e.g., margin requirements),
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but to date that self-regulatory record has been exceptionally good.
The problem with requiring that all OTC transactions clear
through a clearinghouse is that this may not be practical for the most
customized OTC contracts. A better approach would be to attach a
regulatory cost to OTC contracts that do not clear through the clear-
inghouse (in the form of a higher capital or liquidity requirement) to
encourage, but not require, clearinghouse clearing. For contracts
where the social benefits of customization are high, banks’ fees will
compensate them for the higher regulatory costs of bilateral clearing.
With respect to disclosure, one option would be to require that all
derivatives positions be publicly disclosed in a timely manner. Such a
policy, however, has undesirable consequences. Bankers that trade in
derivatives believe that if they had to disclose their derivatives posi-
tions that could place them at a strategic disadvantage with respect
to others in the market, and believe that this might even reduce
aggregate market liquidity. For example, if Bank A had to announce
that it had just undertaken a large long position in the dollar/yen con-
tract, other participants might expect that it would be laying off that
risk in the future, which could lead to a decline in the supply of long
positions in the market and a marked change in the price that would
clear the market. A better approach to enhancing disclosure, there-
fore, would be to require timely disclosure of positions only to the
regulator, and public disclosures of net positions with a lag.
Conclusion
This article has reviewed the major government policy distortions
that gave rise to the subprime turmoil, and has suggested robust pol-
icy reforms to deal with them (i.e., reforms that take into account the
existence of those distortions and the political economy of regulation
and supervision). The proposed reforms would reduce the costs of
distortions related to agency problems, too-big-to-fail problems, and
government manipulation of housing credit markets.
Proposed reforms fall into six areas: (1) micro prudential regula-
tion, (2) macro prudential regulation, (3) the creation of credible
plans for resolving large, complex banks, (4) the reform of housing
policy to eliminate leverage subsidies as the means of promoting
home ownership, (5) the removal of barriers to stockholder discipline
of bank management, and (6) policies that promote improvements in
counterparty risk management and transparency in OTC positions.
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The following is a summary of the 12 policy reforms proposed in
this article:
1. The use of loan interest rates in measuring the risk weights
applied to loans for purposes of setting minimum capital require-
ments on those loans.
2. The establishment of a minimum uninsured debt requirement,
in addition to other capital requirements for large banks. The specif-
ic form of this requirement requires further discussion (candidates
include a specially designed class of subordinated debt, CDS issues,
or contingent capital certificates).
3. The reform of the use of credit rating agencies opinions to
either eliminate their use or require that NRSROs offer numerical
predictions of PD and LGD, rather than letter grade ratings, and be
held accountable for the accuracy of those ratings.
4. A regulatory surcharge (which takes the form of higher
required capital, higher required liquidity, or more aggressive provi-
sioning) on large, complex banks.
5. Macro prudential regulation that raises capital requirements
during normal times in order to lower them during recessions.
6. Additional macro prudential regulatory triggers that increase
regulatory requirements for capital, liquidity, or provisioning as a
function of credit growth, asset price growth, and possibly other
macroeconomic risk measures.
7. Detailed and regularly updated plans for the intervention and res-
olution of all large, complex banks should be prepared by these banks,
which specify how control of the bank’s operationswould be transferred
to a prepackaged bridge bank if the bank became severely undercapi-
talized. These plans would also specify formulas for loss sharing among
international subsidiaries of the institution, and the algorithm specify-
ing those loss-sharing arrangements would be pre-approved by the rel-
evant regulators in the countries where the subsidiaries are located.
8. The winding down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the
phasing out of the FHA and Federal Home Loan Banks, and the
replacement of those leverage subsidies with downpayment assis-
tance to low-income first-time homebuyers.
9. The elimination of bank holding company restrictions on the
accumulation of controlling interests in banks.
10. The relaxation of Williams Act requirements that require buy-
ers of more than a 5 percent interest in a company to announce that
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they are acquiring a significant interest in a company, and the elimi-
nation of regulatory limits on the percentage ownership interests that
institutional investors can own in public companies.
11. The enactment of regulatory surcharges (via capital, liquidity,
or provisioning requirements) that encourage the clearing of OTC
transactions through clearinghouses.
12. Requirements for timely disclosure of OTC positions to regu-
lators, and lagged public disclosure of net positions.
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